Epistemic Argument For Distinction Between Essence and Existence

Feser gives three arguments for the distinction between essence and existence in the objects of our everyday experience (dogs, trees, planets, grass, humans, etc.)

The first argument, the one examined in this post, is what I will call the Epistemic Argument (EA). It seems that we can grasp the essence of a tiger, a T-rex, and a centaur. We can know what each one is. Our grasping of these essences does not seem to include a grasp of the existence of any instance of them. In other words, we can know the essence of something without knowing whether it exists. Put differently, we can know what a thing most fundamentally is, without knowing that it exists. So, essence and existence are distinct. Put a bit more formally, here is the argument Feser provides:

EA1. S can know that the essence of x is E without knowing that x exists
EA2. Knowing that p without knowing that q, implies that p and q are distinct
EA3. Hence, the essence of x is distinct from the existence of x

A problem emerges when we examine the details of the above argument. From the fact that the essence of x is conceptually distinct from the existence of x, it does not follow that the essence of x is really distinct from the existence of x. Being conceptually distinct does not imply being really distinct. Being conceptually distinct (distinct concepts) does not imply being metaphysically distinct (distinct realities).

It is fairly easy to see the problem with the EA.

1. S can know that Mart Twain is a writer without knowing that Sam Clemens is a writer
2. Knowing that p without knowing that q, implies that p and q are distinct
3. Hence, Mark Twain is a writer is distinct from Sam Clemens is a writer.

But if MT = SC, then MT is F if, and only if, SC is F. In other words, identity implies sameness of features. Since Mark Twain is identical to Sam Clemens, any feature that MT has, SC has, and vice versa. So, the conclusion, 3 above, is false. But 3 just follows from 1 and 2. So either 1 or 2 (or both) are false. 1 looks quite plausible. I can know that you are in philosophy of religion, while not knowing that ____(fill in the blank with one of your nicknames or your SS# or…) is in philosophy of religion. So, it looks like the culprit is premise 2. So, premise 2 is false.

Feser, attempts to address this objection.

Question: what is his response, and what do you think of it?




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