Worship, Idolatry, and Divine Simplicity

The following ideas (inspired by Barry Miller's A Most Unlikely God) might help us as we try to make sense of what it means to worship God and not our concept or image of God. 

Limit simpliciter: if x is F, the limit simpliciter of F is still an F.

Example: there is an upper limit of speed, namely, the speed of light.  Notice that the speed of light is still a speed.  So, if x is traveling at the speed of light it follows that x is traveling at a speed.

Example: there is no intrinsic upper limit on the length of a line (there are some complications here, but ignore them, since I don't think they have any real bearing on the main point).  Notice that for any length of some line x, x is still a line.

Example: there is no intrinsic upper limit on the number of sides of a polygon (at least I don't think there is; even if there is it does not matter for the present point). Notice that for any number of sides n of a polygon, if x has n number of sides, x is still a polygon. 

Limit Case: if x is F, the limit case of F is not F, but is related to F in some way.

Example: there is a lower limit of speed, namely, absolute rest, or 0 mph.  Notice that the speed of something at absolute rest is not, strictly speaking, a speed at all.  So, if x is traveling at 0 mph, it does not follow that x is traveling at some speed, even though 0 mph is clearly related to speed in some way. 

Example: there is sort of lower limit on the length of line, namely a point, but, strictly speaking, a point is not a line at all, since a point has no length. But a point is related to a line in some sense.  A point is a limit case of a line. 

Example: there is a sort of upper limit on the number of sides of a polygon, namely a circle. A circle is, in a sense, a 0-sided polygon, but strictly speaking a circle is not a polygon at all. A circle has no sides, while every polygon has sides. But as we add more and more sides to a polygon, we get closer and closer, or point more and more to a circle. 

The distinction between limits simpliciter and limit cases can, I think, help to understand the doctrine of analogy a bit better, and thereby help us to understand the nature of God and our relationship to Him a bit better. 

When we say that God is good and Paul is good we might mean that God’s goodness is the same exact sort of thing as Paul’s goodness.  But if Augustine, Aquinas, and Feser are correct and God is absolutely simple, then that cannot be right.  Paul’s goodness is the same sort of thing as John’s goodness since both are members of the same category (or more specifically, both are members of the same species), but since God is not in any category, the goodness that God is cannot be the same sort of thing as the goodness that Paul and John have.  So when we say that God is good and Paul is good, the term ‘good’ is not being used in the same sense.  We have two options remaining.  The term ‘good’ in 'God is good' and 'Paul is good' may be equivocal or analogical.  But it seems obvious that it is not equivocal.  If it were then God’s goodness would not be related in any way to Paul’s goodness.  So, ‘good’ must be analogical when used in ‘God is good’ and ‘Paul is good.’  

Here’s where the stuff above on limits simpliciter and limit cases may be helpful.  Just as 0 mph is related to 10 mph in some way, so too God’s goodness and Paul’s goodness are related in some way.  0 mph is not really a speed but something to which all speed points to in some sense (either by originating from it or by constantly being related to it).  Similarly, God’s goodness is not the same as Paul’s goodness but God’s goodness is something to which all creaturely instances of goodness point.  God’s goodness is thus a limit case of all creaturely instances of goodness, in a way similar to 0 mph being a limit case of all instances of speed greater than 0 mph.  The same is true for all of the so-called divine attributes.  Divine simplicity implies that there is no composition in God at all.  So God is not distinct from His goodness, His power, His knowledge, etc.  All are God and all are each other.  That is, goodness itself is knowledge itself is power itself.  In God, these are all identical.  Indeed, God is perfect goodness, perfect power, perfect knowledge, etc.  Each creaturely instance of these points to their limit cases.  

Consider power.  We can think of power as coming in degrees. Suppose Steve has the power to build a car only when he has all the car parts available.  Suppose Jan has the power to build the parts of a car only when she has all the parts of the parts of the car available.  Suppose Frank has the power to build the parts of the parts of the car.  Suppose Sue ….  You see where this is going.  Jan seems to be more powerful than Steve, Frank is more powerful than Jan, Sue is more powerful than Frank, ….  Thus, power in the creaturely sense with which we are familiar is determined, at least in part, by the abilities one has with respect to already existing stuff.  

But God’s power is of course greater than any one of the creatures in the above series.  It is greater, but it is also radically different, not really belonging to the series above at all.  God’s power is not measured by what he can do with already existing stuff.  Rather God’s power is such that He can bring about the stuff from absolutely nothing at all.  God’s power is thus a limit case of the above types of power with which we are most immediately familiar.   

Consider knowledge. We can think of knowledge as coming in degrees, or we can think of our justified beliefs as coming in degrees. Suppose Dwight knows that Jim is in pain because Michael told Dwight that Jim is in pain. Suppose that Pam knows that Jim is in pain because Jim told her that he is. Now, suppose that Jim knows that Jim is in pain, because he is experiencing it himself. It seems plausible to think that Dwight is less justified in his belief than Pam, Pam is less justified in her belief than Jim, and Jim is about as justified in his belief as it is possible to get. Dwight's belief that Jim is in pain is more distant from the fact of Jim's pain than Pam's is, and Pam's belief is more distant from the fact than Jim's is, and Jim's belief is about as close to the fact as is possible. So, while there are many ways to know something, Jim's way of knowing seems to be the tightest way, the best way, the most intimate and immediate way of knowing. 

But God's knowledge is of course greater than any one of the creatures in the above series. It is greater, but it is also radically different, not really belonging to the series above at all. God's knowledge is more immediate than even Jim's, for God's knows as the sustainer and creator of all things, the one in whom Jim lives and moves and has his being. God is, in this sense, closer to Jim than Jim himself. So, God's knowledge and Jim's knowledge are related but they are quite different. In this way, God's knowledge is a limit case of the above kinds of knowledge with which we are most immediately familiar. 

Worship: If divine simplicity is true and if the above analyses are in the ballpark of accuracy, then God is beyond all categorization because our categories fit creatures univocally and God analogously. But, if divine simplicity is true, our categories are genuine analogies of God. So, God can be known but only analogously known. And once again this seems to have fairly dramatic implications for worship and idolatry. Idolatry on this analysis is equivalent to putting God into a creaturely category, a category that fits creatures quite well (and if accurate, perfectly) but cannot fit God. And once again this tells us something very interesting about the incarnation. The God-man, Jesus Christ, truly God and truly human, unites the divine nature and the human/creaturely nature perfectly but without confusion--that is, without those natures fusing together to make some third nature. By uniting our lives to the life of Jesus Christ we too can enter into that union. Oh the depths of the riches and wisdom and knowledge of God! (Rom 11: something)