A Serious Problem?

Feser attempts to show that the PSR implies God’s existence. The chief way it does is by showing that there is a distinction between things that are explained by the existence of something else, and things that are explained in virtue of their own being or nature. Since, he argues, we cannot have an infinite regress of things explained by the existence of something else, there must be something that exists that is explained in virtue of its own being or nature.

He rightly, I think, worries about framing the question at issue with PSR as: “Why is there something rather than nothing at all?” (see his Pg 155 ftnt 8) He opts for the following replacement question: “Why are there any contingent things at all?”

I agree that Feser’s question (which is really Pruss’s way of putting it) is better, but I do not think it is the best. Instead, I think it should be: “Why are there contingently existing concrete beings at all?”

Here’s why I think Feser’s way of putting the question needs to be revised.

Feser’s Question: Why are there any contingent things at all?

This way of putting the question seems to imply that it is possible for there to be no contingency at all. But is that possible?

Suppose that it is. What do we have if there are no contingent things at all? Well, we either have absolute nothingness only or absolute necessity only. Feser is right to think that his way of asking the question is better since it is not possible to have absolute nothingness. So, in a state where there is nothing contingent, there cannot be absolutely nothing at all. So, without any contingency we have absolute necessity and nothing else. Is that possible?

Consider the state of affairs (SOA) in which God alone exists. That looks like a SOA with absolute necessity and nothing else. But it is not, or not quite. In such a state, it is still possible for there to be a contingent being. After all, God is able to create such a thing, as we know quite well (I exist!). So, it is contingently true in a state of affairs in which God alone exists, that God alone exists. Thus the proposition:

God alone exists

is contingently true.

Or put differently, the proposition:

Nothing other than God exists

is contingently true.

It is false that God alone exists, but it could have been true, it seems. In such a state (a state where God alone exists), God’s existence implies that something other than God could exist. So, God existing alone is a contingent state of affairs. So, it is not possible to have a state of affairs where there is absolutely no contingency whatsoever.

Question: is this a problem for the Rationalist Proof?

I am not sure whether this is a problem for this proof, but it generates a problem that I hope Feser attempts to deal with later.

The Rationalist Proof relies on PSR. In order for PSR to work something has to be contingent. No problem. I am contingent. And so are you, and you, and everything else we confront in our daily experience. Indeed, the universe as a whole is contingent—God could have refrained from bringing this particular universe into existence. Indeed, God could have refrained from bringing any universe into existence. So, God’s creating a universe is not necessary. But now it looks like we have a problem for the doctrine that God is pure act, simple, existence itself, and maybe PSR.

God could have refrained from creating anything

That statement seems to be true. Suppose it is. But now it looks like God’s being the creator is not a feature of God that He must have. It is not necessary or essential to His nature or being. God is potentially a creator of the universe, but need not actually be a creator the universe. So, in actually creating, God actualizes a potential, contrary to the doctrine that God is pure act. This implies that there is a part of God that is distinct from his nature—being the creator of this universe, and it implies that it is false that God is existence itself, since that implies that every truth about God just is God, but his being the creator is a truth about God that is not identical to God, since God can exist without it being true that he is the creator of something. This may conflict with the PSR because it now looks like God alone is not the sole explanation of the creation. Instead we need God plus his contingent decision to create. So a completely self-explaining being is not enough to explain the creation. We need a self-explaining being, plus a brute fact that the self-explaining being willed to create. Yikes!

Question: Can you detect any problems with the above?

(NB: I am have been in the process of writing a paper on the above for a long time, and I hope to put up a short blog post that attempts to answer it.)